


Modern heating sector - international trends and challenges for the Republic of Kazakhstan. Webinar Course in connection with the preparation of the "Law on Heating"

### The tariff problem – what is the task






#### «Tariff trap» low tariffs, low efficiency, low reliability



Country	Tariff in national currency	Tariff in EURO/ kcal (Euro/Gjoule)
Kazakhstan	3482,39 tg	7,0 (1,7)
Belarus	24,75 bel. Roubles	8,3 (2)
Kyrgystan	1270.93 com	12,8 (3)
Russia	2442,0 Roubles	28 (6,7)

#### Imbalances, cross subsidies



Prices for household customers are held low through cross subsidisation by other customers, particularly the budget sphere.







### The tariff problem – the Task for the future





Performance = Efficiency, supply Best practice quality and reliability, ecological heating system sustainability Best practice heating system Kazakhstan heating system Best practice heating system Best practice Kazakhstan heating system heating system Kazakhstan heating system Kazakhstan heating system Kazakhstan heating system Kazakhstan heating system 2030 2040 2021 1990








### The tariff problem – the Task for the future





Best practice

Performance = Efficiency, supply quality and reliability, ecological sustainability









# Solution: Dedicated regulatory mechanism





#### The regulatory framework for prices in the heating sector needs to renewed

- What? Which tariffs need to be regulated
- How? What methods should be used
- Who? What regulatory body should regulate the prices






















### Which prices should be regulated (1)







#### Specifics of the heating sector

- Technological complexity requires professional, safe, reliable operation and interaction between entities and actors along the value chain of heat generation, transport and consumption
- Limited range for economically viable transport of heat generated
- Capital intensive sector, long-term lock-in following investment decisions
- Substantial influence of local factors climate, levels and ground characteristics of local area
- Close connection with the construction/building sector
- Variety of acceptable organisational approaches and business structures
- Social importance
- Impact on the environment

However, according to regulatory theory, only the existence of natural monopoly or dominat position would unambiguously mandate state regulation of tariffs

In many countries heat prices are not regulated, even in the centralised district heating systems








### Which prices should be regulated (2)








# Which prices should be regulated (3)







# How should the prices be regulated (1)





#### **Step 1: Revenue setting**

- Economically justified operational costs for service provision of the required quality
- Economically justified capital costs including investments for service provision of the required quality now and in the future

#### **Step 2: Cost allocation**

- Costs for different activities
- Classification of costs (energyrelated, demand-related, customer-related)
- Allocation of costs among customer categories

#### **Step 3: Tariff setting**

- Type of customers (voltage level)
- Geographical differentiation (voltage level, location)
- Type of charges (capacity charge, energy charge, standing charge)

**Tariff structure** 

#### **Tariff level**

Tariff Setting Principles / Objectives








### How should the prices be regulated (2)







- In parctice, the difference between these regimes is not strict. Depending on the detailed characteristics, only the name may differ.
- Hybrid forms are often used in practice (combinations of regimes)
- Nearly all methods require detailed calculation of costs and tariff levels








### How should the prices be regulated (3)










### How should the prices be regulated (4)













### How should the prices be regulated (5)













### How should the prices be regulated (6)



#### Step 1: Characteristics of Rate of Return regulation

- Tariffs/Allowed revenue set based on operation costs and «fair» retrurn on invested capital.
- Main aims: cost recovery / recovery of all economically justified costs and low investment risk
- Frequest regulatory reviews (to prevent discrepancy between actual costs and allowed revenues)
- Short regulatory periods, for example 1 year
- This is the traditional regulatory regime and it is widely used
  - At the initial stages, when economic regulation is first introduced,
  - At the beginning of complex sector reforms,
  - When it is necessary to establish a base line of data,
  - When it is necessary to restore quality and reliability of supply,
  - When it is necessary to incentivise investments







### How should the prices be regulated (7)



#### Step 1: Features of incentive regulation

- Determines an upper limit for tariffs or revenues, for separate tariffs/services or for a basket or average tariff
- Main aim: to limit the tariffs, not the profit.
- It ONLY works if regulated companies are allowed to keep the profit they might earn from "overfulfilling" the expected efficiency targets
- Works with longer regulatory periods (pre-determined regulatory periods of 3-5 years are common)
- Requires that companies make additional efficiency gains compared to the presumed tariff formula (X-factor)
- Tariffs and revenues stop being cost-tracking
- The incentives for efficiency increases might cause cost cutting measures which endanger quality of supply consequently quality and reliability need to be explicitly regulated
- Increased investment risks
- Is mainly used once the regulator has a sure basis of data, allowing the prediction of possible efficiency gains

# How should the prices be regulated (8)



#### Step 1: Features of Yardstick competition as regulatory regime

- Prices and revenues are determined on the basis of costs of a group of similar companies
- Companies cannot increase tariffs beyond average costs of the group of similar companies
- Sometimes yardstick competition is based on sector average efficiency improvement predictions
- It is used rarely, only in conjunction with other regulatory regimes








### How should the prices be regulated (9)





#### Step 1: Illustrative regulatory formulas of the common regulatory regimes








### How should the prices be regulated (10)





#### Step 1: Rate of return regulation – Required (allowed) revenues

Required revenues = OPEX + Depreciation + (RAB x rate of return)









### How should the prices be regulated (11)



#### Step 1: Rate of return regulation – Return on assets

- Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) is the value of assets used and useful for the provision of the regulated service
- Regulators usually employ the following principles regarding RAB:
  - The RAB should cover only those assets involved in the provision of regulated services
  - RAB is based on the residual (amortized) cost of capital assets
  - The RAB may include a permitted level of net working capital
  - The RAB should not include capital contributions (external financing, subsidies) to fixed assets from consumers, the state or third parties

- The rate of return is the return that the regulated company is allowed to earn (also known as the opportunity cost of investment capital)
- Based on the weighted average cost of debt and equity (WACC)
- There are several methods for calculating the rate of return
- The most common model used by regulators for the practical calculation of the rate of return is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
- CAPM takes into account the need to compensate the investor for the time value of money, which is represented by the risk-free rate, as well as the premium for taking on additional risk.







# How should the prices be regulated (12)



#### Step 1: Special case – Required (allowed) revenue for heat producers in cogeneration mode

- The main principle is that the total income for the installation must meet the criteria for good tariff regulation.
- This means that income from the sale of electricity must be taken into account when determining the necessary income from the sale of heat - and vice versa.
- At the same time, it is important that the socially beneficial effect of joint production be
  - On the one hand, implemented in favor of consumers of electricity, heat, or both products
  - o On the other hand, turned into an incentive for highly efficient cogeneration
- Different situations depending on whether or not electricity tariffs are regulated or competition is in place
- Regulatory influence can be exercised through the choice of cost sharing method
- However, the choice of method depends on the situation on the electricity and heat market and it is different for different cogeneration plants.
- In European countries with free electricity prices, it is possible to receive surcharges for the price of electricity produced by high-efficiency cogeneration, under the Feed-in-Premium type. This approach was also proposed for the Republic of Kazakhstan. But for this you need to determine the source of funding. In addition, then changes in the rules of the electricity market are required.






# How should the prices be regulated (13)



10'



#### Step 1: Special case - Required (allowed) revenue for heat producers in cogeneration mode



Source: Regulation of Heat and Power in CHP, The World Bank 2003

In the West, the approach is often like this:

- 1. The "permissible" price of heat from a centralized system based on alternative individual heating is determined
- 2. A regulated according to good principles fair price for heat transportation is determined
- 3. 1. minus 2. = "permissible" price of heat from a combined source.
- 4. The rest is the price of electricity
- 5. It is checked whether it is enough to sell electricity in a competitive market.
- 6. In case of shortage the possibility of subsidies (more often according to the Feedin-Premium scheme)

All steps are carried out with iterations - see Workshop 2.5.

Source: Kazenergy National Energy Report, 2019, p. 187










## How should the prices be regulated (14)





#### Step 2: Allocation of costs to cost drivers (cost categories)



Required (allowed) revenue

This is schematic. It will be explained in detail in seminar 3.2.

Income to be collected from customers's tariffs







### How should the prices be regulated (15)





#### Step 3: Setting of tariffs in the appropriate structure

#### Features of appropriate tariff structure

#### Financially sound

Income collected from tariffs equals Allowed Revenue

#### **Cost reflective**

Customers tariffs for each group reflect the different system costs caused by them as closely as possible, thereby providing incentives for efficient level and profile of consumption

#### **Socially acceptable**

Tariffs need to be affordable and all customers, even those on low incomes, should be able to afford a basic service





# Who should regulate prices (2)





	Approval of Tariff Methodology	Setting tariffs for heat from CHP	Setting all other heat related tariffs	
Currently	CRNM	CRNM (no coordination with MoE)	CRNM (central office with local branches)	
Option 1*	CRNM (improved)	CRNM (coordinated with MoE) CRNM (central office with local bran		
Option 2	CRNM (improved)	MoE	CRNM ( central office with local branches)	
Option 3	CRNM (improved)	MoE	Local authorities	
Option 4 **	CRNM (improved)	Local authorities	Local authorities	
Option 5	MoE "Sector Regulator"	MoE "Sector Regulator"	MoE "Sector Regulator"	
Option 6	MoE (new department)	MoE (new department)	CRNM ( central office with local branches)	

<sup>\*</sup> Supported by ADB





<sup>\*\*</sup> At this stage proposed by the draft law "On Heating"

# Who should regulate prices (2)





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Independence	Accountability	Transparency	Predictability	Capacity	Regulatory results
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# Thank you for attention

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